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Abstract
An apology, as an expression of remorse, can be an effective response from a transgressor 
to obtain forgiveness from a victim. Yet, to be effective, the victim should not construe 
the transgressor’s actions in a cynical way. Because low-power people tend to interpret 
the actions of high-power people in a cynical way, we argue that an apology (versus no 
apology) from high-power transgressors should be relatively ineffective in increasing 
forgiveness from low-power victims. We find support for this moderated mediation 
model in a critical incidents study (Study 1), a forced recall study (Study 2) among 
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employees from various organizations and a controlled laboratory experiment among 
business students (Study 3).
These studies reveal the limited value of expressions of remorse by high-power 
people in promoting forgiveness.
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apology, cynicism, forgiveness, power, remorse
Introduction
It is inevitable that organization members sometimes transgress against each other. For 
instance, subordinates may bad mouth supervisors and supervisors may take credit for 
their subordinates’ performance. These episodes can easily develop into full-blown con-
flicts, resulting in decreased job satisfaction, commitment and performance (De Dreu 
and Weingart, 2003). To prevent transgressions from escalating, transgressors can apolo-
gize to the victim. Indeed, an apology is an effective way to obtain forgiveness from a 
victim (Fehr et al., 2010). As Lazare (2004: 1) states, ‘One of the most profound human 
interactions is the offering and accepting of apologies. Apologies have the power to . . . 
generate forgiveness on the part of the offended parties’.
However, apologies are not always effective in promoting forgiveness (Skarlicki 
et al., 2004). Research in close relationships contexts has identified several factors that 
limit their effectiveness. For instance, apologies are less effective following intentional, 
rather than unintentional transgressions (Struthers et al., 2008), and in distal, rather than 
close relationships (McCullough et al., 1998). Although the relevance of apologies in 
response to workplace transgressions is clear (Kellerman, 2006; Kim et al., 2004), sur-
prisingly little work has investigated boundary conditions to the effectiveness of apolo-
gies in stimulating forgiveness in the context of work relationships. To harvest the 
restorative benefits of apologies, it is important to identify when and why apologizing is 
effective or ineffective in promoting forgiveness in the workplace.
We will argue that apologies from transgressors who possess different levels of power 
may not be equally effective. Power is a fundamental organizational variable that shapes 
people’s perceptions of, and interactions with, others in the workplace (Anderson and 
Brown, 2010; Fragale et al., 2011; Magee and Galinsky, 2008). We argue that power may 
also serve as a boundary condition to the effectiveness of apologies in stimulating for-
giveness. To the best of our knowledge, only one prior study has addressed the moderat-
ing role of power in the effectiveness of apologies. In a scenario study, Walfisch et al. 
(2013) found that apologies were more effective in influencing a general index of per-
ceived apology effectiveness when they were communicated by a high- rather than by a 
low-power transgressor, because participants were less likely to expect high-power 
transgressors to apologize.
In the present article, we also address how the effectiveness of an apology hinges on 
the power of the transgressor, relative to the victim. Yet, instead of focusing on a general 
index of perceived apology effectiveness that includes different constructs such as apol-
ogy acceptance, willingness to forgive, how valued the offender is, and the severity of 
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the offence, we focus on the effectiveness of apologies in facilitating forgiveness. We 
argue that a different process explains the moderating role of power in realistic interac-
tions than in scenarios, leading to a very different role for power. We build our argument 
on literature showing that people tend to perceive high-power actors’ actions in cynical 
ways (Fiske and Durante, 2014; Fragale et al., 2011), suggesting that victims may ques-
tion the sincerity of high-power transgressors’ apologies. Because of this effect of trans-
gressor power on victim cynicism we suggest that an apology (versus no apology) 
promotes forgiveness only when the transgressor has low, rather than high power, rela-
tive to the victim. Figure 1a visually represents our proposed model.
Figure 1a. Conceptual model.
Figure 1b. Statistical model.
Apologies and forgiveness
An apology is commonly conceptualized as a verbal or written statement that contains 
one or more of the following components: an expression of remorse, an expression of 
empathy, an acknowledgement of rule-violation, or an offer of compensation (Basford 
et al., 2014; Fehr and Gelfand, 2010; Kim et al., 2004; Leunissen et al., 2013). In study-
ing the effectiveness of different apology components researchers have found that an 
expression of remorse is the most effective component in improving forgiveness (Davis 
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and Gold, 2011; Scher and Darley, 1997; Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009; see Hill, 2013 for 
a meta-analysis). Thus, to be effective, an apology should contain at least an expression 
of remorse.
Remorse is characterized by a transgressor’s negative feelings about the consequences 
of the transgression (Brooks and Reddon, 2003). Forgiveness is defined as a victim’s 
prosocial motivational change toward a transgressor. Specifically, when people forgive, 
they experience a reduced motivation for avoidant and vengeful behavior and an 
increased motivation for benevolent behavior (McCullough et al., 2001). An expression 
of remorse can be effective in promoting forgiveness (Boyd, 2011; Davis and Gold, 
2011; Gold and Weiner, 2000; Scher and Darley, 1997; Tomlinson et al., 2004). This is 
because when the transgressor indicates having negative feelings about the consequences 
of the transgression, the victim is more likely to see the transgression as an instance of 
aberrant behavior and empathizes with the transgressor (Davis and Gold, 2011; Tomlinson 
and Mayer, 2009; Weiner et al., 1991). As a result, the victim may overcome the urge to 
avoid the transgressor or to seek revenge and instead become more prosocial toward the 
transgressor (Tomlinson and Mayer, 2009; Weiner, 1986).
However, as noted, an apology as an expression of remorse does not always promote 
forgiveness (Basford et al., 2014). For an expression of remorse to be effective, its source 
(i.e. the transgressor) needs to be perceived as sincere (Basford et al., 2014; McCroskey 
and Teven 1999). In other words, the victim should not construe the transgressor in a 
cynical way. Cynicism is defined as people’s disbelief of another’s stated or implied 
motives for a decision or action (Andersson and Bateman, 1997; Stanley et al., 2005). 
Cynicism toward the transgressor is likely to influence the victim’s perceived sincerity 
of the apology. When the victim is not cynical toward the transgressor, this implies that 
the victim views the transgressor’s apology as truly remorseful and subsequently for-
gives the transgressor. In contrast, when the victim is cynical toward the transgressor, an 
apology would simply be seen as an empty gesture that does not convey any believable 
information about the transgressor’s remorseful feeling and is, therefore, not likely to 
elicit forgiveness (Basford et al., 2014; De Cremer and Schouten, 2008; Skarlicki et al., 
2004). In line with this argument, Skarlicki et al. (2004) found that when victims believed 
that the transgressor had manipulative intent, an expression of remorse from the trans-
gressor was ineffective in increasing victims’ perceptions of the fairness of the transgres-
sor’s behavior. In studying subordinate reactions to leader apologies, De Cremer and 
Schouten (2008) found that when subordinates believed that the leader was not con-
cerned with them, an expression of remorse from this leader failed to increase subordi-
nates’ fairness perceptions. Similarly, Basford et al. (2014) showed that subordinates 
who doubted their leader’s credibility perceived expressions of remorse as less sincere 
than subordinates who saw their leader as credible. This consequently led to less forgive-
ness, satisfaction with the leader, and organizational commitment. Thus, previous 
research strongly suggests that for an expression of remorse to be effective in stimulating 
forgiveness, victims should not have cynical perceptions of the transgressor. An anteced-
ent that is likely to influence the victim’s cynicism toward the transgressor is the power 
of the transgressor, relative to the victim. In the following section, we elaborate on how 
power may form a boundary condition to the effectiveness of apologies through its effect 
on victim cynicism.
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Transgressor power and victim cynicism
Power is defined as the capacity to influence other people as a result of asymmetric con-
trol over valued resources (Fiske, 1993; French and Raven, 1959; Galinsky et al., 2008). 
Based on the extent to which people have the freedom to choose to comply with power 
holders, power bases are categorized as either harsh or soft power bases (French and 
Raven, 1959; Raven et al., 1998). Harsh power bases include coercive, reward and posi-
tion power, which are characterized as controlling and unfriendly. Soft power bases 
include expert, referent and informational power, which allow people to have more free-
dom in choosing whether to comply or not (Aiello et al., 2013). In the present article, we 
will focus on harsh power bases, particularly, reward and position power. Reward power 
is the ability to reward or withhold valued resources such as salary or promotion oppor-
tunities. Position power is defined as the supervisor’s right to prescribe the subordinate’s 
behavior and the subordinate being obliged to comply because of the position of author-
ity (Etzioni, 1961). We choose these two harsh power bases for two reasons: first, harsh 
power bases are directly in line with common definitions of power as well as with our 
theoretical reasoning that focuses on the harsh aspects of power (Fragale et al., 2011; 
Magee and Galinsky, 2008). Second, reward and position power are the most salient and 
often practiced bases of power in organizations (Aiello et al., 2013; Judge and Martocchio, 
1995; Podsakoff, 1982).
Power (or at least harsh power) has a significant impact on how those who possess it 
are perceived by others (Fragale et al., 2011). Specifically, it is well-established that power 
influences the two fundamental dimensions of social perception: the extent to which 
someone desires to advance interests of the self (i.e. dominance) and the extent to which 
this person is interpersonally benevolent (i.e. warmth) (Abele et al., 2008; Fiske and 
Durante, 2014; Fiske et al., 2007; Fragale et al., 2011). Given that power holders constrain 
people’s free choice, people generally dislike being controlled by power holders (Leotti 
et al., 2010). Thus, they tend to associate power with high dominance and low warmth 
(Fragale et al., 2011). Indeed, Fragale and colleagues (2011) showed that individuals in 
high-power occupations were rated as having more dominance-related traits (i.e. domi-
nant, assertive, forceful) and fewer warmth-related traits (i.e. warm, cooperative, agreea-
ble) than individuals in low-power occupations. In sum, this stream of research shows that 
people generally believe that high-power actors are cold and dominant in relationships, 
while low-power actors are believed to be warm and submissive (Anderson and Brown, 
2010; Fiske and Durante, 2014; Fragale et al., 2009, 2011; Tiedens et al., 2000).
Following this line of research, we argue that low-power victims are cynical about 
high-power transgressors’ underlying motives in workplace relationships. Specifically, 
because people see high-power actors as dominant and cold, they are likely to be cynical 
about high-power actors’ underlying motives. Indeed, in a national survey of the US 
workforce, researchers found that employees are cynical toward their supervisors (Mirvis 
and Kanter, 1991). Moreover, Fiske and Durante (2014) found that people are cynical 
about high-power actors such as political leaders: they perceived political leaders with 
great cynicism and saw them as cold, insincere and dishonest. According to the Edelman 
Trust Barometer’s (2014) global results, people disbelieve that business leaders could 
tell the truth or make decisions in ethical and moral ways.
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Given that the power of the transgressor arguably influences the victim’s cynicism 
toward the transgressor, we argue that the power of the transgressor may moderate the 
effect of expressions of remorse on the victim’s forgiveness. Because people are cynical 
about high-power actors’ interpersonal motives, they are likely to view an expression of 
remorse from a high-power transgressor as an empty gesture that does not convey sincere 
remorse. In line with this argument, scholars have suggested that followers suspect apol-
ogies coming from leaders to be primarily driven by strategic reasons (e.g. to improve 
their public image) rather than by genuine feelings of remorse (De Cremer and Schouten, 
2008; Regehr and Gutheil, 2002). Although not empirically tested, these suggestions are 
in line with our argument that apologies from those who occupy high-power positions 
are perceived with cynicism, making such apologies ineffective in eliciting forgiveness. 
Therefore, we argue that an apology from a high-power transgressor will be less likely to 
elicit forgiveness than an apology from a low-power transgressor would.
On the other hand, apologizing may be effective for low-power transgressors. Low-
power actors may be perceived with less cynicism because they are categorized as sub-
missive and warm in relationships (Fragale et al., 2011). As such, when a low-power 
transgressor apologizes, it is more likely that the apology will be perceived as conveying 
sincere remorse. Therefore, an apology from a low-power transgressor is arguably also 
more likely to elicit forgiveness than an apology from a high-power transgressor. Based 
on the above, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The transgressor’s power, relative to the victim, moderates the positive 
effect of an apology on forgiveness such that the effect is stronger when the transgres-
sor has low, rather than high power.
Hypothesis 2: The moderating effect of the transgressor’s power is mediated by the 
victim’s cynicism toward the transgressor.
Overview of studies
We tested our hypotheses in three studies. Our focus in this article is on identifying 
power as a fundamental boundary condition to the effectiveness of apologies in promot-
ing forgiveness in organizational contexts, rather than studying how apology compo-
nents exert different effects. In three studies we therefore operationalized an apology as 
the most effective and most common apology component – an expression of remorse, 
and contrast it to a commonly used baseline condition in the apology literature – a no-
apology condition (i.e. an apology is absent) (see e.g. Frantz and Bennigson, 2005; 
McCullough et al., 1998; Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Struthers et al., 2008; Tomlinson et al., 
2004; Van Dijke and De Cremer, 2011). In doing so, we are able to present a straightfor-
ward, yet meaningful model of apology effectiveness in the workplace.
Study 1 was a survey conducted among employees working in a variety of different 
organizations using a critical incidents technique (Aquino et al., 2001, 2006; Flanagan, 
1954) – participants were asked to recall an incident in which someone had transgressed 
against them in the workplace. The transgressor’s power was operationalized as reward 
power. After participants recalled an incident, we measured whether this person had 
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apologized for the transgression or not, the transgressor’s reward power (Hinkin and 
Schriesheim, 1989), and whether the participants had forgiven the transgressor or not 
with a well-validated scale (McCullough et al., 2006). This design ensured ecological 
validity by allowing participants to recall any recent workplace transgressions that may 
come to mind.
In Study 2, another survey conducted among US employees, we employed an estab-
lished autobiographic recall procedure (Wallace et al., 2008). We operationalized the 
transgressor’s power as position power. Specifically, we created four conditions by ask-
ing participants to recall a specific incident in which someone of a higher (versus lower) 
hierarchical rank had transgressed against them and had subsequently apologized (versus 
not apologized). We measured forgiveness with the same scale as in Study 1. The strength 
of this approach is that we provided a frame of reference for participants by specifying 
the event they needed to recall. This assured a certain level of internal validity (Hershcovis 
and Reich, 2013). Additionally, we tested that power moderates the effect of apologizing 
on forgiveness because of its effect on victim cynicism (Hypothesis 2).
Studies 1 and 2 both relied on a procedure in which respondents were asked to recall an 
incident that had happened to them. This method has many advantages, most notably the 
fact that the context of the study is meaningful to participants. However, one limitation 
is that the transgression situations described by participants may differ in terms of both 
the severity and the intentionality of the transgression. In Study 3, we therefore maxi-
mized internal validity and tested our hypotheses in a laboratory experiment in which all 
participants experienced the same transgression. Similar to Study 1, we operationalized 
the transgressor’s power as reward power. This methodological diversity allows our 
studies to complement each other and reinforces confidence in our findings (Campbell 
and Fiske, 1959).
Study 1
Method
Participants and design. Two hundred and forty-seven employees (59.9% male) with an 
average age of 31.94 years (standard deviation [SD] = 9.99) were recruited from a 
research panel, Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), to fill out an online questionnaire. 
Following the standard procedures of data collection in the field of management (Schön-
brodt and Perugini, 2013; Simmons et al., 2011; Sprouse, 2011), we decided the rule for 
terminating data collection before the data collection begins. Given that a sample size of 
150 to 250 would ensure stable estimates in regression analysis and AMT has a slightly 
higher rejection rate of responses, we decided to collect 250 observations (Schönbrodt 
and Perugini, 2013). We received 247 complete responses. Studies evaluating the valid-
ity of AMT have shown that the data obtained are as reliable as those obtained from more 
traditional methods (Buhrmester et al., 2011). The design involved an assessment of 
transgressor reward power (as a continuous independent variable) and transgressor 
response (apology versus no apology). Based on the criteria explained below, we 
included in our final data analyses 215 participants (60% male) with an average age of 
32.36 years (SD = 10.14) and an average organizational tenure of 4.43 years (SD = 4.17). 
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Of these respondents, 32.7% were Caucasian, 62.1% were Asian, 3.3% were African 
American and 1.9% were Hispanic/Latino. In terms of hierarchical position, 30.7% 
were line managers/supervisors and 69.3% had a non-management function.
Procedure. The study was conducted online. We used a critical incident technique to 
elicit salient experiences of workplace transgressions (Aquino et al., 2006; Basford et al., 
2014; Karremans and Smith, 2010). Participants were asked to respond to the following 
instruction:
Please recall a specific incident that happened in the last six months, where someone in the 
company did something that offended, harmed, or hurt you. If you cannot recall being offended 
by another person in the last six months, think about the last time you were offended by 
someone in your current or previous company.
Since this task required recalling a specific incident, not all participants were able to 
recall the incident following the instructions. Two independent coders evaluated all the 
incidents in terms of whether they described a workplace transgression or not. We elimi-
nated the data of 32 participants who failed to meet this criterion.
Measures. Participants were provided a definition of apology: ‘an explicit verbal or writ-
ten statement of apologetic intent that contained an expression of remorse’. They were 
then asked to indicate whether the transgressor had apologized to them (yes or no). All 
other items were measured on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree). Victims’ forgiveness of the transgressor was measured with the 18-item Transgres-
sion-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (TRIM) developed and validated by 
McCullough et al. (2006). The items were introduced as follows: ‘For the following state-
ments, please indicate your current thoughts and feelings about the person after the trans-
gression’. Sample items are: ‘I am trying to keep as much distance between us as possible’ 
(reverse coded) and ‘Even though his/her actions hurt me, I have goodwill for him/her’ 
(α = .89). Transgressor power was measured with the four-item reward power scale devel-
oped and validated by Hinkin and Schriesheim (1989). Sample items are ‘He/she can 
increase my pay level’ and ‘He/she can influence my chances of promotion’ (α = .92).
We controlled for the perceived intentionality and severity of the transgression because 
these two variables may give alternative explanations for the process that we set out to 
study: the power of the transgressor may influence the perceived intentionality and severity 
of a transgression (Aquino et al., 2001; Fragale et al., 2009). Perceived intentionality and 
severity are also two important antecedents of forgiveness (Aquino et al., 2001; Byrne et al., 
2014; see Fehr et al., 2010 for a meta-analysis). We therefore asked participants to indicate 
whether ‘He/she did it intentionally’ (adapted from Basford et al., 2014; Struthers et al., 
2008) and whether ‘The transgression was severe’ (adapted from Aquino et al., 2001).
Results
To test the hypothesized interaction effect, we conducted hierarchical regression anal-
yses. In step 1, forgiveness was regressed on perceived intentionality and perceived 
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severity. In step 2, we entered transgressor power and transgressor response as predic-
tors. Lastly, in step 3, we entered the interaction between transgressor power and trans-
gressor response. We effect-coded transgressor response (no apology = −1; apology = 1) 
and centered transgressor power before calculating the interaction term (Aiken and 
West, 1991). Table 1a and Table 1b show the correlations between the study variables 
and results of the regression analysis, respectively.
In step 1, perceived severity (β = −.38, p < .01) and perceived intentionality (β = −.20, 
p < .01) significantly predicted forgiveness, which is consistent with previous literature 
(Aquino et al., 2001; Byrne et al., 2014; Fehr et al., 2010). The significance of these two 
variables did not change in step 2. In this step, the effect of transgressor response was 
significant (β = .20, p < .01), but there was no significant effect of transgressor power 
(β = −.06, p = .33). In step 3, the results for the main effects entered in the previous steps 
did not change. As predicted, step 3 revealed a significant Transgressor Response x 
Transgressor Power interaction (β = −.14, p = .04).1 Figure 2 graphically depicts the 
interaction.
Table 1a. Descriptive statistics and correlations between Study 1 variables.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4
Perceived severity 4.81 1.49  
Perceived intentionality 5.04 1.44 .49**  
Transgressor response −.31 .95 −.01 −.10  
Transgressor power 3.91 1.82 .11 −.12 .16*  
Forgiveness 3.98 1.00 −.48 −.39** .21** −.48**
N = 215. **p < .01, *p < .05. M = mean, SD = standard deviation. For transgressor response, 
−1 = no apology, 1 = apology.
Table 1b. Results of multiple regression analysis of forgiveness on the effects of power and 
apology in Study 1.
Independent variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Perceived severity −.38** (–5.61) −.38** (–5.54) −.38 (–5.61)
Intentionality −.20**(–2.94) −.19**(–2.78) −.17**(–2.52)
Transgressor response .20**(3.23) .21**(3.52)
Transgressor power −.06 (–.98) −.12 (–1.78)
Transgressor response × 
Transgressor power
−.14*(–2.08)
∆R2 .26 .04 .01
Total R2 .26 .30 .31
Adjusted R2 .25 .28 .29
F 37.22** 5.37 ** 4.31*
df 2, 212 2, 210 1, 209
N = 215. Regression coefficients represent standardized parameters (Betas). T-values are in  
parenthesis. *p < .05. **p < .01.
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We tested the nature of the interaction following simple slopes procedures (Aiken and 
West, 1991). These analyses showed that for low-power transgressors, apologizing led to 
more forgiveness than not apologizing did (β = .34, p < .01). However, for high-power 
transgressors, an apology did not lead to more forgiveness than no apology did (β = .08, 
p = .33). This interaction can also be approached from a different vantage point. Among 
transgressors who apologized, high-power transgressors were forgiven less than low-
power transgressors (β = −.25, p = .02). Among transgressors who did not apologize, 
their level of power was irrelevant in predicting forgiveness (β = .02, p = .79).
Study 2
Study 1 provides initial evidence that for low-power transgressors, there is a positive 
effect of an apology on forgiveness. However, for high-power transgressors, this positive 
effect of apologies on forgiveness is absent. Study 1 relied on the critical incident tech-
nique in which participants recalled a transgression. Transgressor power and transgressor 
response were measured afterwards (Aquino et al., 2006; Basford et al., 2014; Karremans 
and Smith, 2010). In Study 2, we attempted to replicate findings of Study 1 using an 
established autobiographic recall procedure (Wallace et al., 2008) in which transgressor 
power and transgressor response were specified. Furthermore, we tested the complete 
moderated mediation model depicted in Figure 1a (Hypothesis 2).
Method
Participants and design. One hundred and fifty-six US employees (57.7% female) with an 
average age of 32.85 years (SD = 9.89) were recruited from AMT. As in Study 1, we 
decided the sample size before the data collection began (Schönbrodt and Perugini, 
Figure 2. Forgiveness level predicted by the two-way interaction between power and apology 
(Study 1).
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2013; Simmons et al., 2011; Sprouse, 2011). Specifically, we chose to collect 160 obser-
vations because it ensures 30 observations in each condition and takes into account 
potential rejection of responses on AMT. We received 156 complete responses. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions that resulted from orthogonally 
manipulating transgressor power (high versus low) and transgressor response (apology 
versus no apology). One hundred and forty-nine participants (59.1% female) were 
included in our final data analysis based on the criteria explained below. Of these, 79.2% 
were Caucasian, 6% were Asian, 6.7% were African American, 6.0% were Hispanic/
Latino, and 2% were Mixed-race. The average age was 32.68 years (SD = 10.04), and 
mean organization tenure was 4.36 years (SD = 3.78). In terms of participants’ hierarchical 
position, 41.7% were line managers/supervisors and 58.3% had a non-management 
function.
Procedure. The study was conducted online. Participants were asked to recall and 
describe an incident in which someone with a higher (/lower) hierarchical position at the 
workplace had transgressed against them and had (/had not) apologized after the trans-
gression (based on Wallace at al., 2008; see also Strelan and Sutton, 2011 for a similar 
approach). Specifically, participants in the high- (/low-) power conditions read:
Please recall a specific incident that happened in the last six months in which someone who has 
power over you (/someone over whom you have power) in your company did something that 
offended, harmed, or hurt you. For example, this person can be someone who has a higher 
hierarchical position, e.g. your direct supervisor (/ someone who has a lower hierarchical 
position, e.g. your subordinate).
Subsequently, participants in the apology/no-apology conditions read: ‘After the inci-
dent, this person apologized (/did not apologize)’.
Participants were given the following definition of an apology: ‘By apology, we mean 
this person offered an explicit verbal or written statement of apologetic intent that con-
tained an expression of remorse’. Subsequently they were asked, ‘Please describe the 
content of the apology in two or three sentences. What did this person say? What did this 
person do?’
Finally, participants read, ‘If you cannot recall being offended by another person in 
the last six months, think about the last time you were offended by someone in your cur-
rent or previous company’.
After completing this task, participants responded to questionnaires assessing their 
cynicism toward the transgressor, their forgiveness of the transgressor, perceived inten-
tionality, the severity of the transgression and manipulation check questions.
As in Study 1, two independent coders read all incidents and evaluated whether par-
ticipants followed the instructions. The coders considered three criteria: (1) whether the 
participants recalled a workplace transgression, (2) whether the participants followed the 
power manipulation instructions and (3) whether the participants followed the apology 
manipulation instructions (i.e. whether participants in the apology condition described 
an apology as an expression of remorse). Eleven participants failed to meet at least one 
of these criteria and were thus excluded from the study. This procedure is comparable to 
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previous studies (Aquino et al., 2006; Basford et al., 2014). After excluding 11 partici-
pants, there were 34 participants in the low-power transgressor and no-apology condi-
tion, 33 participants in the low-power transgressor and apology condition, 37 participants 
in the high-power transgressor and no-apology condition, and 41 participants in the high-
power transgressor and apology condition.
Measures. All items were assessed on seven-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = completely). 
Consistent with Study 1, victim’s forgiveness of the transgressor was measured with the 
TRIM (McCullough et al., 2006; α = .95). Victim’s cynicism toward the transgressor was 
measured with the eight-item cynical distrust scale (Greenglass and Julkunen, 1989). 
Items were introduced as follows: ‘To what extent do you believe this person has the follow-
ing characteristics.’ Sample items are: ‘I think this person would lie to get ahead’ and 
‘I commonly wonder what hidden reasons this person may have for doing something 
nice to me’ (α = .93).
To check the manipulation of transgressor power, at the end of the survey, partici-
pants rated the relative power of the transgressor in the relationship with one item (taken 
from Galinsky et al., 2003): ‘This person has power over me in the company’. To check 
the manipulation of transgressor response, participants indicated how apologetic the 
transgressor was after the transgression with one item (based on Skarlicki et al., 2004): 
‘This person was apologetic to me’. As in Study 1, we measured the perceived intention-
ality of the transgression (‘He/she did it intentionally’) and perceived severity of the 
transgression (‘The transgression is severe’) as control variables.
Results
Manipulation checks. A Transgressor Power (high versus low) × Transgressor Response 
(apology versus no apology) ANCOVA with perceived intentionality of the transgressor 
and perceived severity of the transgression as covariates on the power manipulation 
check revealed a significant main effect of transgressor power (F [1, 139] = 217.14, p < 
.01, η2 = .61). Participants in the high-power transgressor condition perceived the trans-
gressor as having more power (mean [M] = 5.59, SD = 1.44) than participants in the 
low-power transgressor condition (M = 1.93, SD = 1.45). The effect of transgressor 
response (F [1, 139] = .07, p = .80, η2 = .00) and the effect of the Transgressor Power × 
Transgressor Response interaction were not significant (F [1, 139] = .07, p = .79, η2 = 
.00).2 A 2 × 2 ANCOVA on the transgressor response manipulation check revealed a 
significant main effect of transgressor response (F [1, 139] = 123.37, p < .01, η2 = .47). 
Participants in the apology condition perceived the transgressor to be more apologetic 
(M = 5.14, SD = 1.59) than participants in the no-apology condition did (M = 2.21, SD = 
1.56). The effects of transgressor power (F [1, 139] = 1.34, p = .25, η2 = .01) and the 
interaction were not significant (F [1, 139] = .16, p = .69, η2 = .00).3
Hypothesis test. Similar to Study 1, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses to test 
the hypothesized interaction effect. In step 1, forgiveness was regressed on perceived 
intentionality and perceived severity. In step 2, we entered transgressor power (low-
power transgressor = −1; high-power transgressor = 1) and transgressor response (no 
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apology = −1; apology = 1) as predictors. Lastly, in step 3, we entered the interaction of 
transgressor power and transgressor response. Table 2a and Table 2b show the correla-
tions between the study variables and results of the regression analysis, respectively.
In step 1, perceived severity (β = −.31, p < .01) and perceived intentionality (β = −.30, 
p < .01) significantly predicted forgiveness, which is consistent with Study 1 and prior 
research (Aquino et al., 2001; Byrne et al., 2014; Fehr et al., 2010). The significance of 
these two variables did not change in step 2. In this step, the effect of transgressor 
response was significant (β = .19, p < .01), but there was no significant effect of trans-
gressor power (β = −.06, p = .42). In step 3, the results for the main effects entered in the 
previous steps did not change. As predicted, step 3 revealed a significant Transgressor 
Response × Transgressor Power interaction (β = −.17, p = .01).4 Figure 3a graphically 
depicts the interaction.
Table 2a. Descriptive statistics and correlations between Study 2 variables.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5
Perceived severity 4.16 1.86  
Perceived intentionality 4.57 1.98 .48**  
Transgressor response .02 1.00 −.04 −.10  
Transgressor power .08 1.00 .16 .06 .03  
Victim cynicism 4.29 1.46 .52** .43** −.17* .28**  
Victim forgiveness 4.53 1.29 −.45** −.44** .23** −.12 −.59**
N = 145. **p < .01, * p < .05. M = mean, SD = standard deviation. For transgressor response, −1 = no  
apology, 1 = apology. For transgressor power, −1 = low-power transgressor, 1 = high-power transgressor.
Table 2b. Results of multiple regression analysis of forgiveness on the effects of power and 
apology in Study 2.
Independent variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Perceived severity −.31** (–3.82) −.30** (–3.75) −.30** (–3.83)
Intentionality −.30**(–3.64) −.28**(–3.46) −.28**(–3.54)
Transgressor response .19**(2.68) .20**(2.90)
Transgressor power −.06 (–.81) −.06 (–.78)
Transgressor response × 
Transgressor power
−.17*(–2.48)
∆R2 .27 .04 .03
Total R2 .27 .31 .34
Adjusted R2 .26 .29 .32
F 26.50** 3.83 * 6.15*
d.f. 2, 142 2, 140 1, 139
N = 145. Regression coefficients represent standardized parameters (Betas). T-values are in parenthesis.  
d.f. = degrees of freedom.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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We tested the nature of the interaction following simple slopes procedures (Aiken and 
West, 1991). These analyses showed that for low-power transgressors, apologizing led to 
more forgiveness than not apologizing did (β = .37, p < .01). However, for high-power 
transgressors, an apology did not lead to more forgiveness than no apology did (β = .03, 
p = .75). This interaction can also be approached from a different vantage point. Among 
transgressors who apologized, it was less effective to have high power than low power 
(β = −.23, p = .02). Among transgressors who did not apologize, their level of power was 
irrelevant in predicting forgiveness (β = .12, p = .24).
Next, we tested the mediating role of victim cynicism (i.e. Hypothesis 2). Specifically, 
we drew on the mediation procedures of Baron and Kenny (1986) and bootstrapping 
procedures of Preacher and Hayes (2008) and Hayes (2013). These procedures involve 
several steps. First, we tested whether victim cynicism was predicted by transgressor 
power. Second, we tested whether the interaction of victim cynicism and transgressor 
response predicted victim forgiveness. Third, we tested whether the interaction of victim 
cynicism and transgressor response predicted victim forgiveness even after controlling 
for the interaction effect of transgressor power and transgressor response (Preacher and 
Hayes, 2008). Lastly, we tested the significance of the indirect effect using Hayes’ 
PROCESS macro (model 15; 5,000 bootstrap samples).
As a first step, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses to test whether high 
(relative to low) transgressor power leads to more victim cynicism. We entered perceived 
severity of the transgression and perceived intentionality in step 1. Transgressor power 
and transgressor response were entered in step 2. The interaction between these two was 
entered in step 3. Victim cynicism was the dependent variable. In step 1, perceived sever-
ity (β = .41, p < .01) and perceived intentionality (β = .23, p < .01) significantly predicted 
victim cynicism. The significance of these two variables did not change in step 2. In this 
step, the effects of transgressor power (β = .21, p < .01) and transgressor response (β = 
−.14, p = .048) were both significant. In step 3, the significance of perceived severity and 
perceived intentionality did not change. Importantly, the main effect of transgressor 
power remained significant (β = .21, p < .01). The main effect of transgressor response 
was also significant (β = −.14, p = .04). The interaction effect of transgressor power and 
transgressor response was not significant (β = .09, p = .19). Thus, victim cynicism was 
predicted by transgressor power.
We proceeded to test if the effect of apology on forgiveness was moderated by cyni-
cism, such that an apology would lead to forgiveness only among victims low in cyni-
cism. We tested this with hierarchical regression in which we entered perceived severity 
of the transgression and perceived intentionality in step 1. Victim cynicism and trans-
gressor response were entered in step 2. The interaction between these two (based on an 
effect coded version of transgression response and a mean centered version of cynicism) 
was entered in step 3. Victim forgiveness was the dependent variable. In step 1, per-
ceived severity (β = −.31, p < .01) and perceived intentionality (β = −.30, p < .01) signifi-
cantly predicted forgiveness. The significance of these two variables did not change in 
step 2. In this step, the effects of transgressor response (β = .14, p = .04) and victim cyni-
cism were both significant (β = −.41, p < .01). In step 3, the results for the main effects 
entered in the previous steps did not change. As expected, step 3 revealed a significant 
Victim Cynicism x Transgressor Response interaction (β = −.19, p < .01).
 at University of Southampton on June 1, 2016hum.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Zheng et al. 1401
We tested the nature of the interaction following simple slopes procedures. These 
analyses showed that when cynicism was low (1 SD below the mean), apologizing led to 
more forgiveness than not apologizing did (β = .33, p < .01). However, when cynicism 
was high (1 SD above the mean), an apology did not lead to more forgiveness than no 
apology did (β = −.06, p = .52). This interaction can also be approached from a different 
vantage point. Among transgressors who apologized, more forgiveness was observed 
when cynicism was low than when it was high (β = −.62, p < .01). Among transgressors 
Figure 3a. Forgiveness level predicted by the two-way interaction between power and 
apology (Study 2).
Figure 3b. Forgiveness level predicted by the two-way interaction between cynicism and 
apology (Study 2).
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who did not apologize, forgiveness levels were also higher when cynicism was low than 
when it was high (β = −.23, p = .02). Figure 3b visually represents this relationship.
We subsequently tested whether the interaction effect of victim cynicism and trans-
gressor response predicted victim forgiveness even after controlling for the interaction 
effect of transgressor power and transgressor response. Results revealed a significant 
interaction effect of victim cynicism and transgressor response (β = −.22, p = .01). There 
were also significant effects of transgressor response (β = .18, p = .03) and victim cyni-
cism (β = −.55, p < .01) on victim forgiveness. But there was no significant interaction 
effect of transgressor power and transgressor response (β = −.11, p = .20). The effect of 
transgressor power was also not significant (β = .06, p = .49). This suggests a mediating 
effect because after accounting for the interaction effect of cynicism and transgressor 
response, the interaction effect of transgressor power and transgressor response on vic-
tim forgiveness was reduced and became non-significant (Rucker et al., 2011).
Finally, we tested the significance of the indirect effect. This requires testing a model 
in which the moderating effect of transgressor power is mediated by cynicism (Muller 
et al., 2005; Van Houwelingen et al., 2014). However, given that there are no available 
options for testing simple indirect effects in such a model (Hayes, 2013; Rucker et al., 
2011), we treated transgressor power as the independent variable and transgressor 
response as the moderator to assess simple indirect effects by following Van Houwelingen 
et al.’s (2014) procedure. In other words, we rotated our conceptual model to achieve our 
statistical model (see Figure 1b). Conceptually, our moderated mediation model repre-
sents PROCESS model 14. Yet, model 15 is a more conservative model that tests for the 
moderated indirect effect of transgressor power while controlling for the moderated 
direct effect of transgressor power. Thus, we used Hayes’ PROCESS macro (model 15; 
5,000 bootstrap samples).5 As expected, results showed that the effect of high (versus 
low) transgressor power, via cynicism, on forgiveness was negative when receiving an 
apology, indirect effect = −.16, standard error [SE] = .07, 95% confidence interval [CI]: 
[−.31, −.05], thus indicating that compared with low-power transgressors’ apologies, 
high-power transgressors’ apologies led to lower levels of victims’ forgiveness. The 
effect of transgressor power via cynicism was also negative but clearly weaker when no 
apology was offered, indirect effect = −.07, SE = .04, 95% CI: [−.15, −.02], which indi-
cates that compared with low-power transgressors’ no-apologies, high-power transgres-
sors’ no-apologies led to lower levels of forgiveness.
Summary
As in Study 1, Study 2 showed that transgressor power moderates the effect of an apol-
ogy on forgiveness. Receiving an apology, as opposed to not receiving one, promotes 
victims’ forgiveness toward low-power transgressors. However, this effect is absent 
among high-power transgressors. This interaction effect between transgressor power and 
transgressor response was mediated by victim cynicism. Overall, Study 2 supports our 
hypotheses in an organizational context while relying on an established method and 
operationalization of transgressor power as position power.
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Study 3
Both Studies 1 and 2 used recollections of real-life transgression situations, ensuring eco-
logical and some internal validity. In Study 3, we further optimized internal validity by 
having all participants experience the same transgression as part of an (ostensible) inter-
action with another person. In the apology condition, all participants received an identi-
cal apology message; in the no-apology condition, all participants received no message. 
We manipulated the power of the transgressor (relative to the victim) as reward power in 
a social exchange game and tested whether power moderates the effect of an apology on 
forgiveness. In addition, in Study 3 we aimed to replicate the findings of Studies 1 and 2 
using another well-established forgiveness scale (Aquino et al., 2006). Finally, in Study 
3, we aimed to replicate the mediating effect of victim cynicism on the relationship 
between transgressor response and forgiveness.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were 127 undergraduate business students from a 
medium-sized European university (54.1% female) with an average age of 19.91 years 
(SD = 1.62). Again, we decided the sample size before data collection began (Schön-
brodt and Perugini, 2013; Simmons et al., 2011; Sprouse, 2011). We chose to collect 130 
observations because it ensures 30 observations in each condition and there are lower 
rejection rates in the well-controlled lab study (Schönbrodt and Perugini, 2013). Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions of a 2 (transgressor power: 
high versus low) × 2 (transgressor response: apology versus no apology) design.
Procedure. To have all our participants experience the same transgression, we used a 
procedure in which the experienced transgression took the form of a trust violation. The 
paradigm we used is essentially a modified trust game (developed by Leunissen et al., 
2012, see also Desmet and Leunissen, 2014). The trust game (Berg et al., 1995) has been 
widely used in studies on organization issues (Kramer and Lewicki, 2010; McKnight 
et al., 1998). In the trust game, there are two roles: the trustor (Player 1) and the trustee 
(Player 2). Player 1 starts with a sum of endowments (e.g. 10 chips). Player 1 can decide 
how many chips to transfer to Player 2. This number of chips is tripled. For instance, if 
Player 1 transfers five chips to Player 2, then Player 2 receives 15 chips. Player 2 can 
then decide how many chips to return to Player 1. By transferring chips to Player 2, 
Player 1 is vulnerable (i.e. to receive a lower payoff than the initial endowment) in the 
expectation that Player 2 will return some chips. If Player 2 does not return any chips, 
there is a violation of Player 1’s expectation caused by Player 2.
In the modified trust game that we used, all participants were told that they were in the 
role of Player 1 (the trustor) and another participant was in the role of Player 2 (the trustee). 
In reality, Player 2’s actions were preprogrammed. Player 1 started the game with 10 chips 
and decided how much to send to Player 2. After Player 1 transferred the chips to Player 2, 
Player 2 did not return any chips to Player 1. Player 2’s unfair behavior was used to make 
Player 1 feel that Player 2 had committed a transgression (see Leunissen et al., 2012).
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The transgressor power manipulation was designed based on previous work (Tedeschi 
et al., 1973; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959). The essence of reward power, as viewed in this 
prior work, is that one party can reward or withhold resources over the other party. In 
Study 3, we framed Player 2 as controlling Player 1’s outcome without actually changing 
the experimental reward structure. With this manipulation, we simulated a common 
organizational context in which supervisors usually have the ability to influence their 
subordinates’ outcomes, such as their salary. In the low-power transgressor condition, 
participants read:
Player 2 depends on Player 1 to receive chips. Player 1 could, for example, keep all the chips 
for him/herself. Since Player 1 decides on the number of chips he/she transfers to Player 2, 
Player 2 has little power in this game.
In the high-power transgressor condition, participants read: ‘As Player 2 divides the 
chips that are tripled, Player 2 has a lot of power to influence the final division. Thus 
Player 2 has a lot of power in this game.’
After the participant (Player 1) did not receive any chips from Player 2, (s)he first 
evaluated both the intentionality (‘Player 2’s decision was made intentionally’) and 
the severity of the transgression (‘Player 2’s decision severely offended me’) (1 = not 
at all to 7 = completely).6 The transgressor response manipulation then commenced. 
We manipulated the apology as an expression of remorse. In the apology condition, 
participants received an email message from Player 2: ‘Hey! I’m sorry about what just 
happened’. In the no-apology condition, participants received no message (see Frantz 
and Bennigson, 2005; McCullough et al., 1998; Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Struthers 
et al., 2008; Tomlinson et al., 2004; Van Dijke and De Cremer, 2011 for a similar 
procedure).
Measures. After participants read the power manipulation instructions, they rated the 
transgressor’s power in the game with one item: ‘In this game, Player 2 has a lot of power 
over me’ (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree; Galinsky et al., 2003). At the end of 
the study, participants also indicated how apologetic the transgressor was with one item: 
‘Player 2’s message shows that he/she is apologetic’ (1 = not at all; 7 = completely).
After completing the trust game, participants answered questions about their inter-
action with Player 2. We measured victims’ forgiveness of the transgressor with the 
four-item forgiveness scale developed by Aquino et al., 2006 (1 = strongly disagree; 
7 = strongly agree). Sample items are: ‘I will let go of the negative feelings I had 
against Player 2’ and ‘I will let go of my hate and desire for vengeance’ (α = .78). 
Compared with the forgiveness scale used in Studies 1 and 2, this scale can more 
accurately capture participants’ forgiveness level. This is because the items are more 
meaningful to participants who interacted with the transgressor in a one-shot game 
than the scale used in Studies 1 and 2, which are more relevant to repeated interactions 
(e.g. ‘I would cut off the relationship with him/her’). Consistent with Study 2, cynicism 
was measured with the cynical distrust scale(1 = not at all; 7 = completely; α = .81; 
Greenglass and Julkunen, 1989).
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Results
As our game paradigm was designed to induce a transgression with the participant as the 
victim, we checked if all participants ended up having fewer chips than Player 2. On 
average, participants transferred 6.02 (SD = 2.81) chips. Eleven participants transferred 
one or two chips. After receiving zero chips from Player 2, they still had more chips than 
Player 2 had. After excluding these participants, there were 27 participants in the low-
power transgressor and no-apology condition, 31 participants in the low-power trans-
gressor and apology condition, 28 participants in the high-power transgressor and 
no-apology condition, and 25 participants in the high-power transgressor and apology 
condition. The chips transferred by these participants did not differ between high (M = 
5.76, SD = 2.84) and low transgressor power conditions (M = 6.27, SD = 2.78), F [1, 
125] = 1.02, p = .32, η2 = .01.
Manipulation checks. A one-way ANOVA with transgressor power (high versus low) as 
the independent variable and the power manipulation check as the dependent variable 
revealed a significant main effect of transgressor power (F [1, 109] = 139.02, p < .01, 
η2 = .56). Participants in the high-power transgressor conditions perceived the transgres-
sor as having more power (M = 5.91, SD = 1.15) than participants in the low-power 
transgressor conditions did (M = 2.98, SD = 1.43).7 We did not include the transgressor 
response manipulation in the analyses as an independent variable because this manipula-
tion commenced after we posted the power manipulation checks.
An ANOVA with transgressor power and transgressor response as independent vari-
ables and the transgressor response manipulation check as the dependent variable 
revealed only a significant main effect of transgressor response (F [1, 107] = 29.33, 
p < .01, η2 = .22). Participants in the apology condition perceived the transgressor as 
more apologetic (M = 3.71, SD = 1.98) than participants in the no-apology condition 
did (M = 1.87, SD = 1.50). The effect of transgressor power (F [1, 107] = .21, p = .65, 
η2 = .00) and the Transgressor Power × Transgressor Response interaction were not 
significant (F [1, 107] = .02, p = .88, η2 = .00). Thus, the transgressor power and trans-
gressor response manipulations were orthogonally induced.
One-way ANOVA showed that there was no significant difference in attributed inten-
tionality (F [1, 109] = 1.75, p = .19, η2 = .02) or perceived severity (F [1, 109] = 1.35, 
p = .25, η2 = .01) between high-power and low-power transgressor conditions. This con-
firms that participants experienced similar transgression and did not perceive the trans-
gression differently as a function of transgressor power. Therefore, we did not control for 
these two variables as we did in Study 1 and Study 2 in the hypotheses tests.
Hypotheses tests. As in Studies 1 and 2, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses 
to test the hypothesized interaction effect (i.e. Hypothesis 1). In step 1, we entered 
transgressor power (low-power transgressor = −1; high-power transgressor = 1) and 
transgressor response (no apology = −1; apology = 1) as predictors. In step 2 we 
entered the interaction of transgressor power and transgressor response. Tables 3a and 
3b show the correlations between the study variables and results of the regression 
analysis, respectively.
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In step 1, the effects of transgressor response (β = .04, p = .68) and transgressor power 
(β = −.12, p = .23) were not significant. In step 2, the results for the main effects entered 
in the previous steps did not change. As predicted, step 2 revealed a significant 
Transgressor Response × Transgressor Power interaction (β = −.27, p < .01).8 Figure 4a 
graphically depicts the interaction.
We tested the nature of the interaction following simple slopes procedures (Aiken and 
West, 1991). Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, these analyses showed that for low-power 
transgressors, apologizing led to more forgiveness than not apologizing did (β = .38, p = 
.02). However, for high-power transgressors, an apology did not lead to more forgive-
ness than no apology did (β = −.31, p = .07). This interaction can also be approached 
from a different vantage point. Among transgressors who apologized, it was less effec-
tive to have high power than to have low power (β = −.49, p < .01). Among transgressors 
who did not apologize, their level of power was irrelevant in predicting forgiveness (β = 
.20, p = .23).
Next, as in Study 2, we tested the mediating role of victim cynicism (i.e. Hypothesis 2) 
following the mediation procedures of Baron and Kenny (1986) and bootstrapping proce-
dures of Preacher and Hayes (2008) and Hayes (2013). First, we tested whether victim 
cynicism was predicted by transgressor power. Second, we tested whether the interaction 
Table 3a. Descriptive statistics and correlations between Study 3 variables.
Variable M SD 1 2 3
1.Transgressor response .01 1.00  
2.Transgressor power −.05 1.00 −.06  
3.Victim cynicism 4.07 1.05 −.03 .31**  
4.Victim forgiveness 4.90 1.26 .05 −.12 −.36**
N = 111. **p < .01, *p < .05. M = mean, SD = standard deviation. For transgressor response, −1 = no apology, 
1 = apology. For transgressor power, −1 = low-power transgressor, 1 = high-power transgressor.
Table 3b. Results of multiple regression analysis of forgiveness on the effects of power and 
apology in Study 3.
Independent variable Step 1 Step 2
Transgressor response .04 (.42) .03 (.30)
Transgressor power −.12 (–1.22) −.12 (–1.25)
Transgressor response × 
Transgressor power
−.27 **(–2.97)
∆R2 .02 .08
Total R2 .02 .09
Adjusted R2 −.00 .07
F .86 8.79 **
df 2, 108 1, 107
N = 111. Regression coefficients represent standardized parameters (Betas). T-values are in parenthesis.  
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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of victim cynicism and transgressor response predicted victim forgiveness. Third, we 
tested whether the interaction of victim cynicism and transgressor response predicted vic-
tim forgiveness even after controlling for the interaction effect of transgressor power and 
transgressor response (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). Lastly, we tested the significance of 
the indirect effect using Hayes’ PROCESS macro (model 15; 5,000 bootstrap samples).
As a first step, we conducted hierarchical regression analyses to see whether high 
(relative to low) transgressor power leads to more victim cynicism. We entered trans-
gressor power and transgressor response in step 1. The interaction between these two 
was entered in step 2. Victim cynicism was the dependent variable. In step 1, the effect 
of transgressor power was significant (β = .31, p < .01). Transgressor response (β = −.01, 
p = .88) was not significant. In step 2, the main effect of transgressor power remained 
significant (β = .31, p < .01). The main effect of transgressor response was not signifi-
cant (β = −.01, p = .92). The interaction effect of transgressor power and transgressor 
response was also not significant (β = .10, p = .28). Thus, victim cynicism was predicted 
by transgressor power.
We proceeded to test if the effect of apology on forgiveness was moderated by cyni-
cism, such that an apology leads to forgiveness only among victims low in cynicism. We 
tested this with hierarchical regression in which we entered victim cynicism and trans-
gressor response in step 1. The interaction between these two (based on an effect coded 
version of transgression response and a mean centered version of cynicism) was entered 
in step 2. Victim forgiveness was the dependent variable. In step 1, the effects of trans-
gressor response (β = .05, p = .69) and victim cynicism were both significant (β = −.45, 
p < .01). In step 2, the results for the main effects entered in the previous steps did not 
change. As expected, step 2 revealed a significant Victim Cynicism × Transgressor 
Response interaction (β = −.30, p < .01).
Simple slopes analyses revealed a pattern similar to that from Study 2. The analyses 
showed that when cynicism was low (1 SD below the mean), apologizing led to more 
forgiveness than not apologizing did (β = .35, p = .03). However, when cynicism was 
high (1 SD above the mean), an apology did not lead to more forgiveness than no apol-
ogy did (β = −.26, p = .10). This interaction can also be approached from a different 
vantage point. Among transgressors who apologized, forgiveness level was higher when 
cynicism was low than when it was high (β = −.74, p < .01). Among transgressors who 
did not apologize, forgiveness levels were not affected, regardless of whether cynicism 
was low or high (β = −.14, p = .36). Figure 4b visually represents this relationship.
We subsequently tested whether the interaction of victim cynicism and transgressor 
response predicted victim forgiveness even after controlling for the interaction effect of 
transgressor power and transgressor response. Results revealed a significant interaction 
effect of cynicism and transgressor response (β = −.23, p = .049). There was also a sig-
nificant effect of victim cynicism on victim forgiveness (β = −.43, p < .01). The effects 
of transgressor power (β = .01, p = .93) and transgressor response were not significant 
(β = .04, p = .74). The interaction effect of transgressor power and transgressor response 
was still significant but reduced (β = −.23, p = .05). This suggests a mediating effect 
because after accounting for the interaction effect of cynicism and transgressor response, 
the interaction effect of transgressor power and transgressor response on victim forgive-
ness was reduced (Rucker et al., 2011).
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Finally, we tested the significance of the indirect effect following the same procedure 
as in Study 2 (Van Houwelingen et al., 2014) (see Figure 1b). We used Hayes’ PROCESS 
macro (model 15; 5000 bootstrap samples).9 Results showed that the effect of transgressor 
power via cynicism was negative when receiving an apology, indirect effect = −.41, 
SE = .17, 95% CI: [−.82, −.16], thus indicating that compared with low-power transgressors’ 
apologies, high-power transgressors’ apologies led to lower levels of victims’ forgiveness. 
The effect of transgressor power via cynicism was not significant when no apology was 
offered, indirect effect = −.12, SE = .12, 95% CI: [−.44, .06].
Figure 4a. Forgiveness level predicted by the two-way interaction between power and 
apology (Study 3).
Figure 4b. Forgiveness level predicted by the two-way interaction between cynicism and 
apology (Study 3).
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General discussion
Across two surveys among employees and a controlled laboratory experiment with busi-
ness students, we showed that an apology as an expression of remorse can promote for-
giveness but this positive effect hinges on the power of the transgressor. An expression 
of remorse (versus no apology) elicits forgiveness only for low-power transgressors, but 
not for high-power transgressors. This is because the power of the transgressor leads to 
victim cynicism. Across three studies, we operationalized workplace transgressions and 
our dependent and independent variables in different ways. In this manner, the strengths 
of one operationalization compensate for the weaknesses of another. Below we discuss 
the implications and limitations of these findings and offer suggestions for future research.
Theoretical implications
First of all, our findings extend organizational scholars’ understanding about how power 
differences influence workplace conflict resolution. Given that power differences char-
acterize work relationships (Anderson and Brown, 2010; Magee and Galinsky, 2008), 
previous research has highlighted the role of power differences for victim forgiveness in 
the workplace (Aquino et al., 2001, 2006; De Reuver, 2006). However, these studies 
have not considered the role of transgressor responses such as apologies in this process 
(Fehr et al., 2010). The current article integrates these two important antecedents of for-
giveness: power differences and apologies, and examines power differences as the 
boundary condition for the effectiveness of apologies in facilitating victim forgiveness.
Our findings also offer an explanation of why power and apologies interact to influ-
ence forgiveness by focusing on the role of cynicism. While research on employee cyni-
cism has flourished since the 1990s, scholars have mainly focused on how cynicism 
influences employee work related attitudes and performance rather than its role in work-
place conflict resolution (Chiaburu et al., 2013). In line with previous studies suggesting 
that employee cynicism influences supervisor-subordinate relationships (Davis and 
Gardner, 2004), our research shows that cynicism is an obstacle for apologies to be effec-
tive in workplace conflicts. Therefore, our research extends the employee cynicism litera-
ture by highlighting the important role of cynicism in workplace conflict resolutions.
This research also has implications for the power literature. A growing number of 
studies show that power shapes how people perceive power holders (Hinkel and Brown, 
1990; Overbeck et al., 2006; Tiedens et al., 2000). That is, the fact that one possesses 
power will make others see him/her in a specific way – as cold and dominant in relation-
ships (Fragale et al., 2011). However, very few of these studies have examined the impli-
cations of such perceptions for actual interactions in ongoing relationships. As Fragale 
et al. (2011) suggest, person perceptions ‘are a cornerstone of social interactions’ 
(p. 774). Yet, with the majority of studies focusing on how power influences perceptions 
only, it is not clear whether power facilitates or hinders workplace relationships through 
such perceptions. Our research shows that cynical perceptions, as shaped by power in the 
organization, influence a variable that is crucial to the functioning of workplace relation-
ships, that is forgiveness.
Finally, our research also extends the forgiveness literature. A number of researchers 
have argued that offering and accepting apologies is a social ritual prescribing that a 
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transgressor should offer an apology after wronging the other person, and that the victim, 
in turn, should accept this apology (i.e. the apology-reconciliation cycle; Tavuchis, 
1991). However, by focusing on forgiveness, which indicates a victim’s intrinsic pro-
social motivational change toward the transgressor, we caution that forgiveness requires 
more than just a ritualized behavior of accepting an apology; it also requires the person 
who offers the apology to be a believable source. Furthermore, given that a low-power 
victim is less likely to forgive a high-power transgressor after an expression of remorse, 
the obligation of accepting an apology from a high-power transgressor may result in the 
low-power victim reconciling without forgiving, which may then be detrimental to the 
victim’s performance and well-being in the long term.
Practical implications
Apologizing for workplace transgressions is often promoted, especially for leaders who 
transgress against low-power organization members (Kellerman, 2006). One practical 
implication of our findings is that organizational leaders should be aware that because of 
their power position, they are less effective in obtaining forgiveness through a simple 
expression of remorse. It is important to note that we do not claim that leaders should not 
apologize to low-power organization members. Indeed, previous studies have shown that 
leaders who deliver comprehensive apologies that have all apology components are seen 
as more effective and transformational and able to increase low-power organization 
members’ well-being (Byrne et al., 2014; Tucker et al., 2006). Rather, we suggest that a 
simple expression of remorse is not sufficient in obtaining forgiveness for leaders. This 
is because leaders, as those who possess power, are viewed with cynicism. These percep-
tions have nothing to do with the person that occupies the high-power role, but the person 
occupying it needs to realize that his/her role colors employees’ perceptions of ‘the kind 
of person’ he/she is. Thus, to make their expressions of remorse believable and effective 
in facilitating forgiveness, leaders should strive to remove employees’ cynicism toward 
them. For instance, by creating a work environment with high organizational support, 
leaders may remove employees’ cynicism toward them and enhance the effectiveness of 
expressing remorse (Chiaburu et al., 2013). In addition, leaders should consider deliver-
ing comprehensive apologies to remove employees’ cynicism (Byrne et al., 2014; Tucker 
et al., 2006). Likewise, those on the receiving end of an expression of remorse should be 
aware that their perceptions might be biased by an overly cynical view of people in high 
power positions. Thus, it is important that after a transgression that involves parties with 
unequal power, victims are aware of the biases that influence the effectiveness of an 
expression of remorse in eliciting forgiveness.
Limitations and future directions
Like all research, the current studies are not without limitations, which may form an 
impetus for future work. A first limitation is that our research focuses specifically on the 
apology–forgiveness link, and the moderating role of power in this link. Although for-
giveness is fundamental to repairing a damaged relationship, it is possible that power 
plays a different moderating role in the relationship between apologizing and other rec-
onciliation attempts by victims, such as condoning or reconciling with the transgressor 
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(McCullough et al., 2000). In fact, because low-power victims are by definition depend-
ent on high-power transgressors, they may be particularly likely to reconcile with a high-
power transgressor.
Second, our research focuses on the most common and effective apology component 
– expressions of remorse – and shows that for high-power transgressors, a simple 
expression of remorse is ineffective in eliciting victim forgiveness. However, as noted, 
apologies have other components such as expressions of empathy, acknowledgements of 
violated rules/norms and offers of compensation (Fehr and Gelfand, 2010). Especially, 
given that high-power transgressors are seen by low-power victims as having abundant 
resources needed to make amends, they may be expected to offer apologies that send 
‘costly signals’ (Bottom et al., 2002; Ohtsubo et al., 2012). As previous studies revealed, 
costly apologies are more effective in restoring relationships (Ohtsubo et al., 2012). 
Thus, an apology that incurs some cost for high-power transgressors (e.g. offers of com-
pensation) might be particularly effective. In the same sense, high-power transgressors 
could also make substantive amends that send ‘costly signals’. Research showed that 
taking actions to amend is even more effective than a verbal apology (Bottom et al., 
2002). Thus, it is important for future research to investigate effective ways of conflict 
resolution for high-power transgressors using costly signaling theory.
A third limitation of our research is that we operationalized power in terms of harsh 
power bases only (i.e. reward power and position power). These two bases of power are 
often practiced in organizations (Aiello et al., 2013; Judge and Martocchio, 1995; 
Podsakoff, 1982). Yet, it is possible that soft power bases (i.e. referent power, expert 
power and informational power; Raven et al., 1998) may play different roles in shaping 
the effectiveness of apologies. Specifically, soft power bases may lead to less cynicism 
and more perceived humanity, thus making high transgressor power less likely to under-
mine the effects of an apology as an expression of remorse in promoting forgiveness.
Furthermore, we found that high-power transgressors were perceived in a cynical way 
by low-power victims. As a result, victim cynicism leads to diminished forgiveness. In 
previous research on social perception of the powerful, researchers consistently show 
that high power is a salient heuristic that perceivers rely on to form perceptions regard-
less of perceivers’ attributes (e.g. Fiske and Durante, 2014; Fragale et al., 2009, 2011). 
For example, Fragale et al. (2009) showed that high-power transgressors were punished 
more severely because their transgressions were perceived as being more intentional 
than those of low-power transgressors. This thus suggests that our results are driven by 
perceptions of victims as a function of transgressors’ high power, rather than as a func-
tion of victims’ low power. However, given that social power is fundamentally relational, 
it is possible that the diminished forgiveness displayed by a low-power victim toward a 
relatively high power transgressor may be driven by attributes of the low-power victim 
(e.g. having low power makes them cynical). Future studies should further tease out 
whether transgressors’ high power or victims’ low power explains the effects of apolo-
gies on forgiveness. For example, research could test two competing mediators – low-
power victims’ own subjective sense of power and their perceptions of high-power 
transgressors to see which process actually explains (i.e. mediates) the relationship of 
apologies and forgiveness.
In addition, although our findings and previous studies suggest that in general, high-
power people tend to be perceived in a cynical way by low-power people (Fiske and 
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Durante, 2014), it is possible that cynical perceptions of the powerful and the powerless 
vary across different contexts. For example, Inesi et al. (2012) showed that low-power 
people were perceived in a cynical way by high-power people in the context of favor-
exchanges. This is because unsolicited favors from low-power people suggest they have 
instrumental motives such as desires to gain valued resources from high-power people. 
However, in the context of apologies for transgressions, high-power people may be per-
ceived in a cynical way. This is because high-power people have the instrumental needs 
to appear fair and manage impression in the workplace (Greenberg, 1990). Future 
research could test how different contexts moderate the effect of power on cynicism.
The nature of the transgression may moderate the effectiveness of apologies in pro-
moting forgiveness. For example, competence-based violations indicate a lack of techni-
cal and interpersonal skills required for a job while integrity-based violations indicate a 
failure to adhere to sound principles (Kim et al., 2004). Previous studies have shown that 
an apology is more effective for a competence, rather than an integrity-based violation 
(Kim et al., 2004). Consistent with these findings, an apology as an expression of remorse 
for an integrity-based violation may be ineffective when communicated by a high-power 
transgressor because high transgressor power should lead such apologies to be viewed 
with cynicism. In addition, given that leaders as those who occupy high-power positions 
are expected to be competent (Fragale et al., 2011), it is possible that an expression of 
remorse for a competence-based violation is even more ineffective in promoting forgive-
ness than an expression of remorse for an integrity-based violation. Future studies should 
examine the moderating role of the nature of the transgression.
Conclusion
Work settings often include conflicts of interests, thus creating many opportunities for 
transgressions to emerge. Since the functioning of organizations depends on how well 
supervisors and subordinates cooperate, it is essential that they can repair relationships 
by apologizing and forgiving. As indicated by our findings, forgiveness can be achieved 
via an apology that expresses remorse, but only when this apology is given by a trans-
gressor with low power. However, transgressors with high power are ineffective in pro-
moting forgiveness by expressing remorse. This is because high-power transgressors are 
viewed with cynicism.
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Notes
1 Perceived severity did not moderate the interaction of transgressor response and transgressor 
power, p = .20, indicating that perceived severity did not intensify or weaken the interaction 
effects of transgressor response and transgressor power on forgiveness.
2 The effect of transgressor response (F [1, 141] = .02, p = .90, η2 = .00) and the effect 
of the Transgressor Power × Transgressor Response interaction remained insignificant 
(F [1, 141] = .07, p = .80, η2 = .00) without controlling for perceived intentionality and 
severity of the transgression.
3 The effect of transgressor power (F [1, 141] = 1.43, p = .23, η2 = .01) and the Transgressor 
Power × Transgressor Response interaction remained insignificant (F [1, 141] = .14, p = .71, 
η2 = .00) without controlling for perceived intentionality and severity of the transgression.
4 Perceived severity did not moderate the interaction of transgressor response and trans-
gressor power, p = .26, indicating that perceived transgression severity did not inten-
sify or weaken the interaction effects of transgressor response and transgressor power on 
forgiveness.
5 Model 14 revealed the same significant moderated indirect effect of transgressor power: when 
receiving an apology, indirect effect = −.17, SE=.07, 95% CI: [−.32, −.05]; when receiving no 
apology, indirect effect = −.07, SE=.03, 95% CI: [−.15, −.02].
6 To ensure that participants do not suspect that the manipulation of the transgression and that 
the two questions were preprogrammed, we instructed them that each individual would get 
different questions because questions were generated by the system calculation based on the 
amount sent back by Player 2.
7 We checked if the transgressor power manipulation influenced how many chips were sent by 
participants. Results revealed a non-significant effect of transgressor power on the number of 
chips sent, p = .86.
8 Perceived severity did not moderate the interaction of transgressor response and transgressor 
power, p = .88, indicating perceived transgression severity did not intensify or weaken the 
interaction effects of transgressor response and transgressor power on forgiveness.
9 Consistent with Study 2, we tested the indirect effect of transgressor power using model 15 
instead of model 14 to control for the moderated direct effect. In addition, results of model 
14 revealed the same results as model 15: when receiving an apology, indirect effect = −.47, 
SE = .19, 95% CI: [−.94, −.18]; when receiving no apology, indirect effect = −.09, SE = .11, 
95% CI: [−.36, .09].
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